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COMMENT
Executive Power and Regional Climate
Change Agreements
CONOR J. WALLINE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The growing threat of climate change has, over the past
twenty years, spurred numerous unsuccessful attempts to
generate comprehensive binding international agreements aimed
at reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The reluctance of the
United States and other countries to commit to the reduction
targets set forth in the Kyoto Protocol—by far the most
progressive international initiative—as well as the more recent
disappointments at Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, and Rio,
exemplify the difficulty in achieving a global agreement on
climate change mitigation.
In response to these tepid efforts and the lack of political
action at the domestic level, certain U.S. states have begun to
create regional agreements with one another. In particular, the
use of the executive authority of the Governor of New York to
arrange regional agreements like the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, Transportation and Climate Initiative, and MidAtlantic Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation,
underscores the potential for effective regional approaches to
climate change mitigation. Created by executive order, each of
these agreements circumvented the time-consuming and
contentious process of legislative enactment in Albany, and has

* Thanks to Professor John R. Nolon, Professor of Law at Pace Law School
and Counsel to the Land Use Law Center, for his invaluable assistance with the
ultimate direction of this Article.
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subsequently provided a coordinated framework for addressing
climate concerns.
This Article explores the potential for such agreements to
address climate change on a regional level by analyzing the
parallels between the agreements, the nature and limits of the
executive power used to create them, and the scope of
enforcement available under them. Section II briefly examines
the present state of climate warming and its attendant impacts,
while Section III highlights the relative failure of current
national and international approaches to mitigating climate
change. Section IV focuses on the recent rise of environmental
regional agreements in the United States, specifically those
agreements to which the State of New York has been integral.
Section V then explores how the use of executive authority by the
Governor of New York has engendered limited success—primarily
through the greenhouse gas reductions committed to and
realized—in these agreements. The Article concludes by
considering the way these achievements can serve as examples
for the creation of a federal or, ideally, international agreement to
combat climate change.
II. A WARMING STATUS QUO
Unequivocal scientific data confirm that the earth’s climate
system is warming.1 According to the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), “Eleven of
the last twelve years. . .rank among the twelve warmest years in
the instrumental record of global surface temperature (since
1850).”2 Currently, the concentration of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) in
the atmosphere is 392 parts per million (“ppm”), 42 ppm more
than “what many scientists, climate experts, and progressive
national governments are now saying is the safe upper limit for
CO2 in our atmosphere.”3 What’s more, the effects of climate
change on human beings are already apparent. In the past two
years alone, the eastern seaboard of the United States has

1. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT 30 (2007), available at
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Bill McKibben, 350 Science, 350.ORG, available at http://www.350.org/en/
about/science.
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experienced two extreme weather systems (Hurricane Irene and
Superstorm Sandy) that, some scientists speculate, but for the
warming climate and subsequent melting arctic sea ice, likely
would not have made landfall so far north.4 In fact, with
Superstorm Sandy, the melting arctic sea ice helped to create a
“rare late October high pressure area over Greenland. . .[b]y
heating up the Arctic, altering the temperature difference
between the equator [and] the poles, and forcing the jet stream to
slow down and get stuck in big looping meanders. . .”5 This
altered weather pattern helped cause upwards of $50 billion in
damage to the eastern seaboard alone.6 Worst of all, this is not
expected to be an isolated event: as New York Governor Andrew
Cuomo acknowledged in an op-ed immediately following Sandy,
“Extreme weather is the new normal.”7 Essentially, extreme
weather events—including not only hurricanes, but also heat
waves, heavy rains, and snowstorms—are now more likely than
ever to occur because of anthropogenic greenhouse gas (“GHG”)
emissions.8
Experts agree that a dual approach is necessary to address
this truly global problem.9 First and foremost, countries must
agree to limit their GHG emissions. The IPCC, in no uncertain
4. Larry O’Hanlon, How Much Climate Change Was in Hurricane Sandy?,
DISCOVERYNEWS, Nov. 2, 2012, available at http://news.discovery.com/earth/
sandy-and-the-record-arctic-sea-ice-melt-121102.html.
5. Id.
6. Chris Isidore, Sandy’s cost to economy: Up to $50 billion, CNN MONEY,
Nov. 2, 2012, available at http://money.cnn.com/2012/11/02/news/economy/
sandy-economic-impact/index.html.
7. Andrew Cuomo, Op-Ed., We will lead on climate change, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/lead-climatechange-article-1.1202221.
8. See Morgan Bettex, Study sees changing intensity of storms from
warming, MIT NEWS (Oct. 25, 2010), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2010/weakersummers-1026.html.; see also Justin Gillis, Study Finds More of Earth is Hotter
and Says Global Warming Is at Work, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/07/science/earth/extreme-heat-is-coveringmore-of-the-earth-a-study-says.html?hp&_r=0; see also Nick Cumming-Bruce,
U.N. Agency Says 2012 Ranks Among Hottest Years, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2012,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/science/earth/un-agency-says2012-ranks-among-hottestyears.html?hp&gwh=B7176927CD5D9746F8B764CCE827503A.
9. See generally Alison G. Kwok & Nicholas B. Rajkovich, Addressing
climate change in comfort standards, 45 BUILDING & ENV’T 18 (2010), available
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0360132309000456.
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terms, has stated that “unmitigated climate change would, in the
long term, be likely to exceed the capacity of natural, managed
and human systems to adapt.”10 As a result, fairly radical
measures—possibly including a 60% net reduction in GHG
emissions by 2050—will need to be implemented “[t]o stabilize
atmospheric GHG concentrations at close to current levels.”11
Second, the world is going to have to adapt to the changing
climate and its effects. While some adaptive measures have
certainly occurred, much more comprehensive adaptation will be
necessary to decrease vulnerability to the myriad effects of
climate change, a fact demonstrated by the devastating impacts
of Superstorm Sandy on both New York and New Jersey.12 The
onus of achieving effective adaption measures will be primarily
on state and local governments, since factors like location,
geographical
features,
weather
patterns,
and
current
infrastructure will play a critical role in determining which
measures to implement.13 Efforts to mitigate GHG emissions, on
the other hand, must be made on a more comprehensive basis.
III. TEPID DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL
EFFORTS
Given the scientific unanimity that anthropogenic climate
change is occurring, and the threat it poses to the continuing
survival of the planet as well as our way of life, it would not be
unreasonable to think that far-reaching international efforts are
in the process of combatting it. Yet, this is not the case. As of
summer 2013, there was still no truly global agreement aimed at
mitigating GHG emissions.
In fact, even the NovemberDecember 2012 round of climate talks in Doha, Qatar did not

10. IPCC, supra note 2, at 73.
11. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE,
LAW, AND SOCIETY 631 (Aspen, 4th ed. 2010).
12. IPCC, supra note 1, at 73.
13. Elizabeth C. Black, Climate Change Adaptation: Local Solutions for a
Global Problem, 22 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 359, 360 (2010) (arguing that, “[u]nlike
mitigation, adaptation efforts largely involve local decision-making, making it
difficult to ensure that those responsible for creating the problem also play a
role in solving it.”).
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produce anything more than modest gains.14 In 2011, the 17th
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Durban, South Africa
yielded an agreement that only the European Union (“EU”) and a
small group of other countries, which combined accounted for less
than fifteen percent of global GHG emissions, could agree to.15
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted and ratified by much of the
international community in late 1997—though not becoming
effective until 2005—is the closest the world has come to setting
binding emissions reduction targets for the top GHG emitters.16
Unlike the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (“UNFCCC”), which merely encourages the stabilization
of GHG emissions levels, the Kyoto Protocol actually binds
countries to reductions targets.17
The United States refused to ratify the Protocol for two
reasons. First, Kyoto was perceived as being largely futile
because it does not bind countries like India and China, two of
the world’s largest GHG emitters,18 to any strict reductions
targets. Though the U.S. was still the largest emitter at the time,
the prospect of nonbinding obligations on two of the world’s most
significant sources of GHG emissions and economic competition
did not improve the Protocol’s image. Second, the George W. Bush
Administration thought that the commitments in the Protocol, if
rigidly adhered to, would “wreck” the U.S. economy.19 This
resulted in the Senate objecting to the Protocol and ultimately

14. Justin Gillis, With Carbon Dioxide Emissions at Record High, Worries on
how to Slow Warming, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/12/03/world/emissions-of-carbon-dioxide-hit-record-in-2011-researcherssay.html?hp.
15. Karl Ritter, UN Climate Change Conference Opens in Doha, Qatar,
HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 26, 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/11/26/un-climate-change-conferencedoha_n_2189959.html?utm_hp_ref=green.
16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
Kyoto Protocol (2012), available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
items/2830.php.
17. Id.
18. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Global Emissions (last updated June 14,
2012), http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html.
19. Associated Press, Bush: Kyoto Treaty Would Have Hurt Economy,
MSNBC, June 30, 2005, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8422343/
ns/politics/t/bush-kyoto-treaty-would-have-hurt-economy/#.ULQfROOe_Kg.
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passing a resolution to block U.S. involvement in it.20 While false
dichotomies like ‘environment or economy’ are in disrepute,21
appealing to them has proven a highly effective means by which
to defeat or delay action on environmental concerns, this being
but one example.
Following Kyoto were several more relative failures,
including the Copenhagen Summit of 2009, out of which came
pledges—but no binding agreement—by the U.S. and China to
reduce emissions,22 the 2010 Cancun Climate Summit,23 the 17th
COP in Durban, South Africa,24 and Rio+20.25 Though these are
the most significant climate summits resulting from the Kyoto
process, COPs have occurred almost annually since 1997, often
without heads of state in attendance. Unfortunately, the obvious
lack of political will in these interim conferences has resulted in
nothing of significance. The absence of mandatory reduction
targets has been a constant theme in the international context
and continues to plague global efforts to mitigate climate change.
But the United States’ failure to address climate change has
not been limited to the international context. Congress has also
been unsuccessful in enacting any comprehensive national

20. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
21. See generally F. Michael Willis, Economic Development, Environmental
Protection, and the Right to Health, 9 GEO. INT’L L. REV. 195 (1996); For an
argument that cap-and-trade programs will actually benefit the global economy,
see Aaron Ezroj, How Cap and Trade will Fuel the Global Economy, 40 ENVTL.
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10696 (2010).
22. Sarah Terry-Cobo, Timeline: The Road to Climate Change Policy, PBS
FRONTLINE, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/
stories/carbonwatch/2010/05/timeline-the-road-to-climate-change-policy.html.
23. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Cancun Agreement Rescues UN Credibility But
Falls Short of Saving Planet, The Guardian, Dec. 12, 2010, available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/dec/12/cancun-agreement-rescuesun-credibility.
24. See Ritter, supra note 16; Durban’s failure is primarily a result of the
inability of existing signatories to agree to an extension of all of Kyoto’s targets,
which ultimately led to an agreement that has done little to change the current
projections of nearly a four degree Celsius temperature hike over the next ten
years. Richard Black, Climate talks end with late deal, BBC NEWS (Dec. 11,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-16124670.
25. See Bryan Walsh, What the Failure of Rio+20 Means for the Climate,
TIME, June 26, 2012, available at http://www.time.com/time/health/
article/0,8599,2118058,00.html.
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legislation addressing GHG emissions.26 Both the House of
Representatives’ Waxman-Markey bill and the Senate’s KerryBoxer bill, while championed by climate experts as “essential to
establishing a regulatory system that would achieve real
emissions reductions, while still considering the needs of the
energy industry,” were ultimately rendered impotent by
Congressional inaction.27 Interestingly, the State of California
passed legislation in 2006 that “established emissions caps in line
with those agreed on in Kyoto—chiefly, to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 and to bring those 1990 levels
down by a further 80 percent by 2050.”28 In addition to those
caps, the Golden State has developed a carbon market for
emissions trading, one of the first of its kind in the U.S.29
However, while California’s progressive actions are laudable, the
State cannot successfully solve the problem on its own. As a
consequence of the United States’ (and other countries’) refusal to
commit to Kyoto or any other binding international framework,
overall reductions in global GHG emissions have not been
achieved at a level sufficient to truly combat the current rate of
climate change.
Further complicating the process of achieving a binding
international agreement on climate change is the underlying
problem shared by many environmental issues: the tragedy of the
commons.30 Originally recognized by Garrett Hardin, the tragedy
of the commons is the result of individuals externalizing costs
when engaged in strategic, rational decision-making regarding
shared resources.31 Because the commons is collectively owned
and thus available for general use, each entity’s rational self26. Terry-Cobo, supra note 22.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See generally Christopher Burt, C02 and Regulation Authority: The Legal
and Policy Implications of California’s Proposed Cap-and-Trade Program and
Clean Air Act National Ambient Air Quality Greenhouse Gas Regulation, 44
URB. LAW. 429 (2012); see also Sarah Terry-Cobo, Timeline: The Road to Climate
Change Policy, PBS FRONTLINE, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.pbs.org/
frontlineworld/stories/carbonwatch/2010/05/timeline-the-road-to-climate-changepolicy.html.
30. Stephen M Gardiner, The Real Tragedy of the Commons, 30 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 387 (2001); See also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The
Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. L. 241, 253 (2000).
31. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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interest militates against preservation since the cost of
exploitation to the individual is less than the (short-term) benefit
gained.32 To the self-interested, rational actor, the choice is clear.
The current state of climate change, being the result of the
accumulation of many individual state actions, exemplifies this
mindset: the perceived economic benefit associated with not
reducing GHG emissions outweighs, to many of the most
substantial emitters, the attendant cost of climate warming.
However, as Harden predicted, this individual rationality can be
collectively destructive: “Ruin is the destination toward which all
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that
believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons
brings ruin to all.”33
In
particular,
climate
change—because
of
its
intergenerational component—presents what Stephen Gardiner
argues is the “real tragedy of the commons.”34 The effects of CO2
emissions on global temperature will not be fully realized until
after the turn of the twenty-second century, making them most
pressing for generations still unborn.35 Yet, the present
generation benefits greatly from the energy produced by readily
available and relatively cheap GHG-emitting fuel sources. Thus,
“the present generation both causes the environmental damage
and reaps the rewards” while “most of the costs fall on future
generations.”36 Gardiner’s ultimate conclusion is less than
optimistic: “So, what happens is completely up to the present
generation. And it has powerful self-interested incentives to
exceed the capacity and thereby alter the climate. . .[O]ther
things being equal, it is reasonable to expect that the commons
will be deeply harmed by the present generation.”37
Yet this view is arguably too pessimistic. While the
governments of the world have thus far been unable to reach a
comprehensive international agreement, and the U.S. has also
lagged domestically in passing legislation, not every level of
government has been idle and ineffectual.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 1244.
Id.
Gardiner, supra note 30, at 387.
Id. at 402-03.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
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IV. THE RISE OF REGIONAL RESPONSES TO
CLIMATE CHANGE
The response in the United States to the muted national and
international efforts has been for states—in particular, New
York—to form regional agreements with one another to address
climate change. These agreements range in scope from the capand-trade program of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(“RGGI”)38 to the promotion of transit-oriented development in
the Transportation and Climate Initiative (“TCI”)39 to the wideranging sea level rise adaptation measures of the Mid-Atlantic
Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation (“MAGAOC”).40 So
far, regional approaches have been particularly effective,
especially given their relatively limited reach, in addressing
certain aspects of climate change, and ultimately can serve as a
viable alternative to national and international action for the
foreseeable future.
A. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
New York State has arranged or signed onto several regional
agreements. By far the most widely known is RGGI. Developed by
former New York Governor George Pataki in conjunction with
several other northeastern states,41 and agreed to in 2005,
RGGI’s primary contribution to the fight against climate change
has been a successful cap-and-trade program on power plants
among the Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states of New York,
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and (formerly) New Jersey.42
The success of RGGI has to do with the fact that “the combined
greenhouse gas output of the group [of states comprising RGGI] is
38. See generally RGGI, An Initiative of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic
States of the U.S., available at http://www.rggi.org/.
39. See generally Georgetown Climate Center, Transportation and Climate
Initiative, available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/state-action/
transportation-and-climate-initiative.
40. See generally Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, available at
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/press-materials.htm.
41. Kirsten H Engel, Mitigating Global Climate Change in the United States:
A Regional Approach, 14 N.Y.U. L.J. 54, 69 (2005).
42. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding (2005), available at
http://www.rggi.org/.
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14 percent of U.S. emissions and 3.2 percent of world
emissions.”43 RGGI, therefore, “has the capacity to reduce a
substantial portion of U.S. emissions and to serve as an example
for a national emissions trading regime.”44
Included among the commitments made by RGGI member
states are developing and maintaining individualized “CO2
Budget Trading Programs,” tracking CO2 allowances, monitoring
the newly-created carbon market, and providing technical
assistance programs designed to assist member states in the
process of improving the Initiative.45 The Initiative has been
relatively successful to date, with analysts projecting that the
“investments made between 2009 and 2011 using proceedings
from the allowance auctions. . .will help avoid the emission of 12
million short tons of carbon dioxide pollution.”46 Moreover, RGGI
also has helped utility customers save over one billion dollars in
energy costs, has “channeled over $617 million into the region’s
clean energy economy,” and has generated thousands of clean
energy sector jobs in the region.47
However, one of the primary shortcomings of RGGI is the fact
that the agreement itself lacks any truly binding enforcement
mechanisms.48 As a result of the agreements voluntary nature,
several state legislatures—including Delaware, Maine, and New
Hampshire—have attempted (unsuccessfully) to pass bills
removing their respective state from RGGI’s cap-and-trade
program.49 In November 2011, however, New Jersey Governor
Chris Christie provided notice to the other states in the Initiative
that New Jersey would be withdrawing from its agreement to the

43. Engel, supra note 41, at 66.
44. Id. at 66.
45. RGGI, Mission Statement (2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/rggi.
46. RGGI Investments Cut 12M Tons of CO2, ENVTL. LEADER, Nov. 27, 2012,
available at http://www.environmentalleader.com/2012/11/27/rggi-investmentscut-12m-tons-of-co2/.
47. Id.; see also Joanna Zelman, RGGI Cap-And-Trade Boosted State
Economies: Report, HUFFINGTONPOST, Mar. 1, 2011, available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/01/rggi-cap-and-trade_n_829734.html.
48. Mission Statement, supra note 45.
49. Sam Wurzelmann, RGGI’s Benefits, Costs, and Why It Should Stay, THE
ENERGY COLLECTIVE, June 16, 2011, http://theenergycollective.com/wurzelmann/
59328/rggi-s-benefits-costs-and-why-it-should-stay.
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Memorandum of Understanding,50 citing the lack of regulation on
states like Pennsylvania as part of its reason for doing so.51 But
this is not the end of the story.
In June 2012, several
environmental groups, including the Natural Resources Defense
Council, sued the Christie Administration for the unilateral
withdrawal from RGGI, claiming that it violated a Notice and
Comment requirement imposed by administrative rules.52
Whether this lawsuit will force New Jersey to remain a
temporary member of RGGI until proper administrative
procedures have been followed is yet to be seen, but regardless of
how it is resolved, RGGI’s targets and programs are still legally
unenforceable.
B. The Transportation and Climate Initiative
Focused on altogether different sources of GHG emissions,
TCI’s efforts are aimed at mitigating emissions from tailpipes
rather than factory smokestacks. Created by the Georgetown
Climate Center at Georgetown University in June 2010, TCI is
directed by transportation, energy, and environmental agency
heads from New York, Maine, Connecticut, Delaware,
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, Rhode Island,
Maryland, New Jersey, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.53
The Initiative “seeks to stimulate sustainable economic
development and improve the environment by supporting
innovative technologies and smart planning, and through finding
greater efficiencies within the transportation sector.”54 TCI’s

50. BOB MARTIN, COMM’R NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., NOTICE OF
WITHDRAWAL OF AGREEMENT TO THE RGGI MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
(Nov. 29, 2011).
51. New Jersey Quits RGGI, Bans Coal Plants, ENVTL. LEADER, May 27, 2011,
available at http://www.environmentalleader.com/2011/05/27/new-jersey-pullsout-of-rggi-bans-coal-plants/.
52. Andrew Harris, New Jersey Sued Over Greenhouse Gas Initiative PullOut, BLOOMBERG, June 6, 2012, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-06-06/new-jersey-sued-over-greenhouse-gas-initiative-pull-out.html.
53. Georgetown Climate Center, supra note 39.
54. GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, TRANSPORTATION AND CLIMATE INITIATIVE
OF THE NORTHEAST AND MID-ATLANTIC STATES: BUILDING THE CLEAN ENERGY
ECONOMY AND REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS IN THE NORTHEAST 1,
available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/
files/TCI%20brochure.pdf.

11

2014]

EXECUTIVE POWER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

815

primary focus is on “developing clean vehicles and alternative
fuels,” “creating sustainable communities” through transitoriented development, and “advancing more efficient freight
movement.”55 Mixed-use and transit-oriented development (or,
collectively, “smart growth”56) can help to reduce annual vehicle
miles traveled (“VMT”), a key indicator of transportation-related
GHG emissions.57
Because GHG emissions from the transportation sector
represent nearly thirty percent of total U.S. emissions, regional
cooperation in the realm of mass transit has the opportunity to be
incredibly successful in reducing overall GHG emissions.58 While
federal environmental statutes like Title II of the Clean Air Act
provide the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) with
authority to regulate non-stationary sources and impose lightduty vehicle emissions standards,59 cooperation and regulatory
oversight with respect to development of mass transit systems
and promotion of efficient regional freight movement is still
inadequate.60 In the absence of a fully coordinated federal
approach, TCI has provided—at least for the Northeast and MidAtlantic regions—an effective approach to these transportationrelated issues. One of its most significant achievements has been
the creation of the Northeast Electric Vehicle Network, a group of
northeast states committed to working together to regionally plan
for expanded use of electric vehicles, particularly with respect to

55. Id.
56. Former Maryland Governor Parris Glendening is credited for coining the
phrase “smart growth.” Karen O’Keefe, Smart Growth’s Governor Parris N.
TOWN
PAPER
1
(2004),
available
at
Glendening,
6
THE
http://www.tndtownpaper.com/Volume6/parris_glendening.htm.
57. PETER HAAS ET AL., TRANSIT ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR VMT-RELATED GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS GROWTH REDUCTION 2 (Center
for
Transit
Oriented
Development
2010)
available
at
http://www.cnt.org/repository/TOD-Potential-GHG-EmissionsGrowth.FINAL.pdf.
58. NICHOLAS M. BIANCO & FRANZ T. LITZ, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: USING EXISTING FEDERAL AUTHORITIES AND
STATE ACTION 12 (World Resources Institute 2010).
59. Id.
60. Joanna D. Malaczynski & Timothy P. Duane, Reducing Greenhouse Gas
Emissions From Vehicle Miles Traveled: Integrating the California
Environmental Quality Act with the California Global Warming Solutions Act,
36 ECOLOGY L. Q. 71, 79 (2009).
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siting charging stations.61 Promoting use of non-fossil fuel
burning vehicles can have a significant impact on reducing GHG
emissions, and TCI has made a coordinated effort on this front
possible.

C. The Mid-Atlantic Governors’ Agreement on Ocean
Conservation
Both RGGI and TCI are regional initiatives focused on
mitigating GHG emissions. The MAGAOC, on the other hand, is
oriented toward adaptation to the inevitable impacts of climate
change. Recognizing that “the economy, environment and quality
of life of the Mid-Atlantic region will be significantly impacted by
climate change and associated sea level rise in the coming
decades,” the MAGAOC’s concern is with arguably the greatest of
all commons: the Atlantic Ocean.62 Created in 2009 by the
Governors of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and
Virginia, the MAGAOC formed the Mid-Atlantic Regional Council
on the Ocean (“MARCO”) with the express intent of
“[maintaining] and [improving] the health of our ocean and
coastal resources, and [ensuring] that they continue to contribute
to the high quality of life and economic vitality of our region’s
communities well into the future.”63
The MAGAOC recognizes the interrelationship between
communities and economies, and hopes to capitalize on that
understanding through coordinated efforts aimed at protecting
sensitive habitats and populations from climate change-related
risks like flooding and erosion.64 As of 2011, the MAGAOC’s
largest contributions to effective climate change adaptation have
been the development of “targeted messaging of the risks of

61. Northeast states form electric vehicle network, WALL STREET JOURNAL
(Oct. 19, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/
APd8e72ba90ab5493fa4c6bcfd5f1319d1.html.
62. ACTIONS, TIMELINES, AND LEADERSHIP TO ADVANCE THE MID-ATLANTIC
GOVERNORS’ AGREEMENT ON OCEAN CONSERVATION 9 (June 4, 2009), available at
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/summary-actions.pdf.
63. Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, Mid-Atlantic Governors’
Agreement on Ocean Conservation, June 4, 2009, available at
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/agreement.pdf.
64. Id.
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climate change and sea level rise to communities” and the
collection of comprehensive data necessary to “create a regional
sea level rise inundation map.”65 While these achievements may
appear limited at this time, they are a first and necessary step to
implementing more comprehensive climate change adaptation
measures.
V. GUBERNATORIAL EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY
Common to each of the three aforementioned regional
agreements is the source of authority used to create them.
Gubernatorial executive authority generally is greater in scope
than its federal analog, which is restricted by the U.S.
Constitution.66 This is the case because “‘state governments[,]
acting through their state legislatures[,] are presumed to have
broad, residual, almost plenary governmental power’ except
insofar as these are limited by state constitutions,” and often
gubernatorial executive authority is conferred by statute.67 Since
“all of the states have made statutory changes. . .and/or
constitutional changes to grant their governors more formal
powers,” gubernatorial executive authority is maximally provided
for throughout the United States.68 In particular, the unique
powers afforded the Governor of New York have been
instrumental in the creation and development of the three
regional agreements at the heart of this Article.
In New York, the constitutional provision providing for
gubernatorial executive power was added in 1821 “in apparent
emulation of the vesting clause in the United States
Constitution.”69 This was not the final word on gubernatorial

65. MID-ATLANTIC REGIONAL COUNCIL ON THE OCEAN, HIGHLIGHTS: MOVING IN
THE RIGHT DIRECTION 7 (2011), available at http://www.midatlanticocean.org/
mitrd.pdf.
66. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (stating that “the executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years…”).
67. Gerald Benjamin & Zachary Keck, Executive Orders and Gubernatorial
Authority to Reorganize State Government, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2010).
68. Margaret R. Ferguson, Roles, Functions, and Powers of the Governors,
CTR ON THE AM. GOVERNOR (2013), available at http://governors.rutgers.edu/
usgov/gov_intro_chpt2.php.
69. Benjamin & Keck, supra note 67, at 1615.
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authority in New York, however. Over the next hundred or so
years, the New York Constitution would be revamped several
times leading to, among other changes, amendments that
provided for a more powerful Governor with a four year term and
expanded authority over all state agencies and the budget
process.70 While the roles and responsibilities of all state
governors are basically the same, the scope of authority of each
state’s governor varies in accordance with the respective state
constitutions and laws.71 New York’s current Constitution
provides that the Governor shall “expedite all such measures as
may be resolved upon by the legislature” and “take care that the
laws are faithfully executed.”72 Moreover, when the Governor of
New York issues an executive order pursuant to lawful authority,
“his or her actions are largely beyond judicial review.”73
Therefore, according to New York Jurisprudence, a leading source
on New York law:
[J]udicial review of a governor’s action by executive order
pursuant to a valid grant of discretionary authority is generally
limited to determining whether the state constitution or
legislature has empowered the governor to act, and does not
include the manner in which the governor chooses to discharge
that authority. For abuse of lawful discretionary authority, the
remedy as a rule lies with the people at the polls, or with a
constitutional amendment, or with corrective legislation.74
Ultimately, the Governor of New York has broad authority to
issue executive orders and otherwise exercise executive power,
including through control of administrative agencies. That
authority, however, is not without its limits.
Several times since the mid-Twentieth Century, the New
York Court of Appeals—the court of last resort for the State—has
invalidated the Governor’s use of executive power as “[going]

70. John T. Buckley, The Governor—From Figurehead to Prime Minister: A
Historical Study of the New York State Constitution and the Shift of Basic Power
to the Chief Executive, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 865, 867 (2005).
71. Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Governors’ Powers and Authority (2011),
http://www.nga.org/cms/home/management-resources/governors-powers-andauthority.html.
72. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
73. 96 N.Y. Jur. 2d State of New York § 12.
74. Id.
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beyond state legislative policy and [prescribing] a remedial device
not embraced by the policy.”75 However, in giving definition to
what “going beyond” state legislative policy means, the Court, in
Clark v. Cuomo, said, “It is only when the executive acts
inconsistently with the legislature, or usurps its prerogatives,
that the doctrine of separation [of powers] is violated.”76 Thus,
“the purposes of the executive order[,] however desirable, may be
achieved only through proper means. No single branch of
government may assume a power, especially if assumption of that
power might erode the genius of that system. The erosion need
not be great.”77
Understanding the basic strictures of gubernatorial executive
authority in New York is crucial to an analysis of that power as it
was used to create and join the three regional agreements
discussed in this Article. This is so because, as John Cahill noted
regarding his involvement in environmental issues in New York,
the development of environmental law and policy “really came
down to the executive utilizing the powers that he has, through
executive orders, through control of the regulatory agencies that
are under his domain, as well as his authorities to use market
powers to help change and help drive the environmental policy.”78
Gubernatorial executive authority has proven particularly
invaluable in the realm of environmental law and policy in New
York State. First, it has allowed for relatively quick responses to
pressing environmental concerns by avoiding expressly dealing
with the New York State legislature, a tremendous advantage
when immediate and decisive action is necessary.79 Moreover,
executive authority has allowed for incremental, small-scale
changes to environmental policy and law.80 While landmark court
cases and legislation concerning environmental matters are
important, these smaller, more frequent actions have a
significant impact as well. By creating continuity in progress,

75. Rapp v. Carey, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 163 (1978); see also Oneida Cnty v. Berle,
49 N.Y.2d 515 (1980).
76. 66 N.Y.2d 185, 189 (1985).
77. Rapp, 44 N.Y.2d at 167.
78. John P. Cahill, Environmental Law in New York State: The Past as
Prologue to the Future, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 441, 441 (2008).
79. Id. at 444.
80. Id. at 447.
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these changes have allowed the private sector to confidently
invest in new technologies and processes. Finally, the use of
gubernatorial executive authority also has allowed the Governor
to take action on controversial environmental issues that were
unlikely to be addressed by the more politically-mind state
legislature. While the general public may support action on
certain matters, “there’s always the issue of dealing with
particular legislators in both houses to try to accomplish anything
in the New York Legislature.”81 This is particularly the case in
Albany, where achieving progress through the legislative process
can seem impossible at times.82
A great example of effective use of executive power to tackle a
politically-charged environmental problem is Governor Pataki’s
response to dirty air in New York City. In 2000, the Metropolitan
Transit Authority (“MTA”)—which provides all of the mass
transit services in New York City—was the largest purchaser of
buses in the world and needed to submit a new five year capital
plan.83 Governor Pataki decided that the diesel buses, whose
emissions of significant amounts of particulate matter, nitrogen
oxide, and sulfur oxide were creating a public health crisis,
needed to be redesigned to improve air quality.84 To accomplish
this, the Governor helped develop a capital plan that required
MTA to convert to natural gas and hybrid buses, which led to
significant improvements in air quality in the city.85 Had this
been attempted in the state legislature, there is no telling how
much more time and political capital would have been necessary
to achieve the result ultimately obtained through unilateral
executive action. Immediate action was necessary, and executive
authority allowed the Governor to decisively address the problem.
This is but one example of the Governor utilizing the Office’s
great potential.
Another example involves the creation and maintenance of
RGGI’s cap-and-trade program. As noted, RGGI originated in
2001 when Governor Pataki announced the formation of the
Greenhouse Gas Working Group, a coalition of Northeast states
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 443.
Cahill, supra note 78, at 444.
Id.
Id. at 444-45.
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committed to addressing climate change.86 In 2003, “the Governor
sent a letter to all of the northeastern states asking them to join
in a cap-and-trade program for the northeast [because the United
States was] not going to see action on a federal level and [] the
region needed to do something.”87 RGGI was officially agreed to
in a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005,88 which led to
further statewide commitments by then-Governor David
Patterson in Executive Order No. 24 in 2009.89 In part, the
Governor committed the State to reductions of “current
greenhouse gas emissions from all sources within the State eighty
percent (80%) below levels emitted in the year nineteen hundred
ninety (1990) by the year two-thousand fifty (2050).”90
TCI is also the product of executive authority, albeit through
the proxy of administrative agencies. The heads of the
transportation, environmental, and energy agencies in each of the
state signatories to the Initiative are tasked with evaluating
current infrastructure and transportation options and creating
regional policies to promote sustainable development and smart
growth.91 The Initiative is meant to build on the progress of
RGGI by focusing on vehicle emissions as a supplement to RGGI’s
efforts to reduce power plant emissions.92 Representing New York
were Commissioner Alexander B. Grannis of the New York
Department
of
Environmental
Conservation,
Acting
Commissioner Stanley Gee of the New York Department of
Transportation, and Chairman Garry A. Brown of the New York

86. Id. at 446.
87. Id.
88. RGGI, Memorandum of Understanding (2005), available at
http://www.rggi.org/design/history/mou.
89. State of New York, Exec. Order No. 24 (2009).
90. Id.
91. Transportation & Climate Initiative, Agreement of the Northeast and
Mid-Atlantic States to Support Sustainable Communities (June 7, 2011),
available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/
TCI_Sustainable_Communities_June2011(1).pdf.
92. Georgetown Climate Center, Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States Launch
Major Climate and Transportation Initiative (June 16, 2010), available at
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/northeast-and-mid-atlantic-states-launchmajor-climate-and-transportation-initiative.
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Public Service Commission.93 These agency heads set as the goal
for New York State a reduction in VMT of 10%.94 Such a
commitment likely would have required significantly more time
and capital to pass the legislature, and may well never have
occurred.
The MAGAOC, which formed MARCO, was created in a
manner more similar to RGGI than TCI. New York Governor
David Paterson, along with New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine,
hosted the Mid-Atlantic Governors’ Ocean Summit in June
2009.95 The summit resulted in the signing of the MAGAOC by
five eastern and mid-Atlantic coastal states.96 The governors of
the member states agreed to, among other things, “[c]oordinate
protection of important habitats and sensitive and unique
offshore areas on a regional scale,” “[c]ollaborate on a regional
approach to support the sustainable development of renewable
energy in offshore areas,” and, importantly, “[p]repare the
region’s coastal communities for the impacts of climate change on
ocean and coastal resources.”97 Noting that much of the
infrastructure in the Northeast and mid-Atlantic regions is
unprotected, the Council further agreed to “[i]dentify key
infrastructure that is vulnerable to sea level rise” and initiate
“adaption measures to collectively reduce the region’s
vulnerability to climate change and sea level rise.”98 These farreaching efforts on adapting to the realities of climate change on
a regional level likely would not have been possible to achieve in
the legislatures of each of the five participating states. Rather
than wait for more aggressive action, Governors Paterson and

93. Transportation & Climate Initiative, Declaration of Intent ( ), available at
http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/public-documents/TCIdeclaration.pdf.
94. Transporation & Climate Initiative, Summary of Policy Options in State
Climate Action Plans ( ), at 6, available at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/
sites/default/files/public-documents/TCI-SummaryofPolicyOptionsin
ClimateAction.PDF.
95. Actions, Timelines, and Leadership to Advance the Mid-Atlantic
Governors’ Agreement on Ocean Conservation (2009), at 1, available at
http://www.midatlanticocean.org/summary-actions.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Mid-Atlantic Regional Council on the Ocean, supra note 63.
98. Actions, Timelines, and Leadership, supra note 95, at 1.
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Corzine took the initiative to develop and promote another
successful regional environmental organization.
This desire for decisive action is a common theme among
many regional agreements. Gubernatorial executive authority
has allowed for these agreements (and countless others) to be
created and entered into by states across the U.S. without wading
into the gridlock of state legislative action. But the ease and
relative flexibility provided by regional agreements is not without
its limitations.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON EXECUTIVE
AUTHORITY
Each of the three agreements discussed herein was created
and has been maintained through the exercise of gubernatorial
executive authority. However, the United States’ federalist
system of governance includes certain limiting characteristics
that check the power of its competing bodies, including the power
of individual states. The Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution
and the doctrine of separation of powers limit, respectively, the
ability of states to engage in binding agreements with one
another to the exclusion of the federal government and the power
of the executive. Regional climate change agreements must be
evaluated in light of each of these characteristics of the U.S.
system.
A. Compact Clause
One of the primary shortcomings of regional agreements in
general—and of RGGI, TCI, and MAGAOC in particular—is the
fact that they lack regulatory enforcement authority. This is the
case not only for political reasons, but also because of the limits
imposed by the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Article
I, section 10 of the U.S. Constitution dictates that “[n]o State
shall, without the Consent of Congress. . .enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power.”99 This Constitutional prohibition on cooperative state
action severely limits the potential impact that regional

99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
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agreements can have on interstate issues. However, the
prohibition is not as absolute as it appears.
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the scope of the
Compact Clause before the turn of the Twentieth Century in
Virginia v. Tennessee. There, the Commonwealth of Virginia and
the State of Tennessee disputed the location of a boundary line
that had been established by legislative decree nearly a century
before.100 In the course of determining the validity of the
boundary line, the Court analyzed whether the agreement
between the states constituted a constitutionally-prohibited
compact. After giving examples of the kinds of agreements and
compacts that would not require Congressional consent, Justice
Field declared that by “[l]ooking at the clause in which the terms
‘compact’ or ‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition
is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the
increase of political power in the states, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United
States.”101 He further clarified that Congress can consent to
compacts both expressly and by implication, such as when
Congress enforces an agreement between states.102 Ultimately,
the Court held that Congress had implicitly consented to the
agreement between Virginia and Tennessee fixing the boundary
line, and that it therefore was valid and constituted the legal
boundary between the states.
More recently the Supreme Court has given further guidance
on this definition of prohibited compacts. In U.S. Steel
Corporation v. Multistate Tax Commission, at issue was the
validity of an agreement between multiple states to form a tax
commission to facilitate uniformity in state taxation in the
region.103 The Court there held that the “number of parties to an
agreement is irrelevant if it does not impermissibly enhance state
power at the expense of federal supremacy.”104 Despite the fact
that the compact may result in an “incremental increase in the
bargaining power of the member States [in relation to] the
corporations subject to their respective taxing jurisdictions,” the
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Com. of Va. v. State of Tenn., 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893).
Id. at 519.
Id. at 521.
434 U.S. 452, 456 (1978).
Id. at 472.

21

2014]

EXECUTIVE POWER AND CLIMATE CHANGE

825

Court held that the agreement did not enhance the political
power of the states at the expense of the federal government
enough to violate the Compact Clause.105 In so holding, the Court
carefully enumerated two key considerations leading to this
conclusion: first, that “each State retain[ed] complete freedom to
adopt or reject the rules and regulations of the Commission”; and
second, that “each State [was] free to withdraw at any time.”106
In other words, so long as agreements between states are largely
voluntary, the Compact Clause likely will not pose a problem.
The regional agreements at the heart of this Article are
largely insulated from challenges under the Compact Clause
because of their unenforceability, a constitutionally required yet
severely limiting feature. Kirsten Engel, Professor of Law at the
University of Arizona, agrees, arguing that “[a]s a result of the
Compact Clause. . .regional action on climate change is ‘safest’
constitutionally if limited to voluntary, nonbinding efforts among
participating states.”107 RGGI provides the prime example of how
this constitutionally-required unenforceability can limit the
potential positive impact of regional climate change agreements.
New Jersey Governor Christie’s decision to unilaterally withdraw
from RGGI in 2012, a decision currently embroiled in litigation,
was only feasible because of this limitation.108 Citing the
unenforceability of the agreement, as well as the perceived notion
that “RGGI does nothing more than tax electricity, tax our
citizens, tax our businesses, with no discernible or measurable
impact upon our environment,”109 Governor Christie engaged in
the very conduct that plagues voluntary agreements like RGGI,
TCI, and MAGAOC. By withdrawing the State of New Jersey
from the Initiative, Governor Christie singlehandedly reduced the
overall impact on emissions reductions in the region and the
bargaining power of RGGI member states.
The unenforceability of compacts that otherwise would
challenge federal supremacy is a necessary feature to survive
105. Id. at 472-73.
106. Id. at 473.
107. Engel, supra note 41, at 73.
108. See infra Section IV.
109. Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10-State Climate
Initiative, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/05/27/nyregion/christie-pulls-nj-from-greenhouse-gas-coalition.html?_r=0.
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judicial scrutiny, but it also severely limits the efficacy of regional
agreements. Ultimately, as long as regional climate change
agreements are based on voluntary compliance or consented to by
Congress, the Compact Clause does not pose a significant legal
barrier. 110 The advantage to seeking and receiving congressional
consent is that the states involved could ensure enforceability and
simultaneously
comply
with
constitutional
strictures.
Congressional action, however, is more easily discussed than
achieved, and it is for that reason that the doctrine of separation
of powers is also a necessary component of the U.S. system of
governance.
B. Separation of Powers
The Compact Clause is not the only constitutional limit
affecting regional agreements. The doctrine of separation of
powers applies to these agreements as well. The doctrine
demands that each branch of government—executive, legislative,
and judicial—exercise only those powers granted to it by the
governing charter. For the purposes of this Article, that
governing charter is the New York Constitution.
Separation of powers in New York is “included by implication
in the pattern of government adopted by” the state.111 Generally,
the legislature is authorized to make laws—and the “critical
policy decisions” that inform them—while the governor is
delegated the authority to enforce those laws.112 However, New
York’s lawmaking department is not as discretely defined as
most. In New York, the legislature is not the sole lawmaker;
rather, the legislature, in conjunction with the governor, fills that
role.113 Therefore, while the executive cannot directly legislate,
the Governor of New York has substantial power over
administrative rulemaking, a process that can be difficult to
differentiate from lawmaking.114 Importantly, however, any
110. See Engel, supra note 41, at 73-75.
111. Principles of separation, generally, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law §
152.
112. Limitations with respect to legislature, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law
§ 158; see also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 250.
113. Limitations with respect to legislature, 20 N.Y. Jur.2d Constitutional Law
§ 158.
114. Id.
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exercise of power by a branch not accorded that power constitutes
a violation of the doctrine, such as “when the executive acts
inconsistently with the legislature, or usurps its prerogatives.”115
It is just this potential scenario, the executive overstepping its
defined limits, that is of concern for regional climate change
agreements.
One of the advantages to the regional agreements discussed
herein is the ability of the executive branch to circumvent the
legislature, either through executive order or direction to the
commissioners of the many state agencies. This not only saves
time and resources, but also preserves political capital that the
executive needs to effectively promote his or her agenda.
However, it is this very characteristic of RGGI, TCI, and
MAGAOC that could result in the agreements’ invalidation on
grounds of violation of separation of powers.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Saratoga County
Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, addressed the separation of
powers issue in the context of casinos on Native American
reservations. Former Governor Cuomo entered into a compact
between the St. Regis Mohawk Tribe and the State of New York
to allow the tribe to continue providing gambling services, an
action challenged by Chamber of Commerce as violating
separation of powers.116 The Court held that because there was
no legislative authorization for the state agencies to regulate
casino gambling, the Governor’s actions constituted a usurpation
of the legislature’s power.117 Critically, however, the Court also
held, in Bourquin v. Cuomo, that “[l]egislative inaction, because
of its inherent ambiguity, ‘affords the most dubious foundation for
drawing positive inferences’” of hostile legislative intent.118 In
other words, simply because the legislature has not yet acted on a
matter does not necessarily remove it from the realm of executive
control or render executive action on it ultra vires.
Nevertheless, Saratoga County could prove problematic for
regional climate change agreements like RGGI, TCI, and
115. Principles of separation, supra note 112.
116. Saratoga Cnty Chamber of Commerce v. Pataki, 100 N.Y.2d 801, 808-09
(2003).
117. Id. at 823.
118. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 787-88 (1995) (quoting Clark v. Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185,
190-91 (1985)).
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MAGAOC. Each of these agreements was executed precisely
because of the lack of legislative will to address the problems of
power plant emissions, vehicle emissions, and insufficient coastal
adaptation measures. Therefore, it would not be surprising if a
New York court were to find that any of the three agreements
was the result of the executive overstepping its constitutionallydefined role by promulgating agreements outside of what is
legislatively authorized. However, given the Court’s caution in
Bourquin that legislative inaction is not necessarily indicative of
adverse legislative intent, there is room for argument that RGGI,
TCI, and MAGAOC are not the result of the Governor usurping
legislative authority. If and when this is found to be the case, the
scope of executive action available as a result could lead to an
increase in the prominence of regional agreements.
VII. REGIONAL AGREEMENTS AND THE WAY
FORWARD
Regional agreements have much to offer in the way of
mitigating and adapting to climate change. This is so for several
reasons. First, “a regional program is likely to encompass a larger
geographic area and more centers of population, and thus is likely
to have the potential to result in a larger contribution to climate
change mitigation than an approach limited to a single state. .
.”119 Therefore, when compared to the emissions-reduction
potential of individual state or municipal actions, a regional
approach is more likely to cast a wider emissions reduction net,
thereby more dramatically affecting overall GHG emissions.
Second, because regional approaches to emissions reductions
employ uniform standards of regulation within the respective
region, greater emissions reductions should be achievable because
the predictability of a uniform standard is likely to “overcome
industry resistance to greenhouse gas regulation.”120 Admittedly,
a uniform federal standard would be ideal; but regional
approaches at least offer consistency on a greater level than mere
state or municipal initiatives. Consequently, though the

119. Engel, supra note 41, at 68.
120. Id. at 69.
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proverbial “race to the bottom”121 is a common occurrence in the
context of disparate, localized environmental law, it is probable
that the “benefits of a uniform regional approach [are] likely to
outweigh the benefits of particular ‘pockets’ of less stringent
regulation.”122 Moreover, many resources are regionally located
(e.g., the coal deposits of Appalachia and the natural gas reserves
of the Marcellus Shale region), so the existence of regional
standards guiding how those resources are harnessed and used
can, to an extent, combat the race to the bottom.
Finally, and most important, is the fact that regional
approaches to climate change “allow states to develop a joint
strategy to reduce greenhouse gases, and, at the same time,
ensure reliable energy sources for the region.”123 For example,
because electricity is provided for on a regional basis in the U.S.,
and because electricity production in the form of fossil-fuel-fired
power plants contributes over one-third of annual U.S. GHG
emissions,124 regional approaches to reductions are likely to
substantially affect the electricity sector’s GHG emissions.125 The
wider the emissions reductions net cast, the greater the impact
that can be realized, and at this time regional agreements provide
the largest feasible net.
Yet, regional agreements suffer from their own imperfections.
Adding to the complexity of achieving successful regional
cooperation is the notion that, in such multi-actor paradigms,
states are aligned against one another in a macroscopic version of
the prisoner’s dilemma.126 The concept of a prisoner’s dilemma
“illustrates a conflict between individual and group rationality,”
where “it is difficult to get rational, selfish agents to cooperate for
their common good.”127 Because regional agreements must be

121. The “race to the bottom” is a phenomenon wherein individual
jurisdictions with disparate environmental regulatory systems seek to attract
industry with increasingly relaxed laws.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 70.
124. NICHOLAS M. BIANCO & FRANZ T. LITZ, REDUCING GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: USING EXISTING FEDERAL AUTHORITIES AND
STATE ACTION 10 (World Resources Institute 2010).
125. Engel, supra note 41, at 70-71.
126. See Engel, supra note 41, at 74; see also Gardiner, supra note 30.
127. Steven Kuhn, Prisoner's Dilemma, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
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voluntary in order to avoid Compact Clause problems,128
individual ‘state rationality’ can override the collective interest
embedded in strict compliance with the requirements of the
agreement. Such individual self-interest overtaking the collective
good can—much like Governor Christie’s decision to unilaterally
withdraw from RGGI in 2012 did—compromise the efficacy of an
agreement that otherwise has great potential.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regional agreements aimed at addressing the causes and
effects of climate change are being used by states like New York
to address environmental concerns that have yet to gain national
traction. These agreements have yielded remarkable results, but
they are not ideal. Aside from the potential constitutional hurdles
they face, their scope is inherently limited to the region in which
they apply. For a truly global problem like climate change, this
scope may not be broad enough to prevent the long term
catastrophic consequences of a warming planet.
Ultimately, regional agreements best serve as stopgaps until
effective national—and eventually international—approaches to
mitigating and adapting to climate change can be implemented.
Such a model of localized effort resulting in more far-reaching
action is not unprecedented. In fact, “[m]any U.S. federal
environmental laws and multilateral international environmental
agreements came about partly in reaction to the regulatory
measures implemented by lower-level jurisdictions.”129 This
trend, as well as the existing cooperative framework of most
federal environmental law, allows for ready integration by
Congress of regional agreements into a more unified national
approach. Yet, until the political will to effectuate national
legislation appears, regional agreements will continue to play a
vital and central role in addressing climate change.

spr2009/entries/prisoner-dilemma/.
128. See infra Section VI.
129. Engel, supra note 41, at 64.
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